The World Economic Forum, held this year at Davos on January 20, is usually a dry affair. Politicians and businessmen come to shake hands, get photographed, and talk about sustainable business practices, all without rocking many boats beyond the walls of the convention centre.
Apparently, Canadian PM Mark Carney didn’t get the memo.
His 17-minute speech slammed the rules-based international order – the principles of which he still supports – as built on domineering American hegemony. He described neoliberal economic integration as a tool of global subordination and acknowledged that Canada “avoided calling out” the hypocrisy and falseness of the system so long as it was benefiting them.
It was a remarkable mea culpa, the kind of rhetoric you’d expect to hear from a Marxist on a picket line, not the previous Governor of the Bank of England.
He’s not the only Western politician feeling the winds change. At the same event, French President Macron spoke of “imperial ambitions” reasserting themselves in Europe, the Middle East, and across Africa. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told lawmakers that the current state of the world makes it a “good moment” to start drinking. The powers that be are spooked.
These statements follow some of the most dramatic weeks in recent geopolitical history. The US kidnapping of Venezuelan president Maduro stunned the international arena, and Washington’s open focus on oil and regional hegemony has bypassed the standard post-regime change fare of projecting concern for human rights and democracy.
After toying with the idea of interventions in Cuba, Colombia and Mexico, Trump – to the horror of Nato allies – turned his attention to Greenland, insisting that the US must seize control of the Denmark-controlled, resource-rich island for “national security” purposes. Although Trump has backed down from a full military invasion and his ever-reliable tariff threats, it was a visible reminder that, as Carney said in his speech, strong powers in alliances will “exempt themselves when convenient”.
While economic warfare and sporadic military strikes are longstanding weapons in the USA’s arsenal – just a brief glance at Latin America alone presents a colourful diplomatic history – their use has rarely been this unsubtle, nor this unfocused. The (relatively) well-oiled propaganda machines and general solidarity from the broader West that defined the 90’s and 2000s are now facing internal rifts, and the populist backlash to previous interventions is encouraging greater public scrutiny of Western international efforts.
The groundwork for this current global instability has existed since before the Recession, but these post-2008 years of low growth and international instability in particular have given way to a sharp qualitative shift in geopolitical/economic relations.
With this, eyes have turned eastwards. The West’s hesitant embrace of China as an emerging economic partner has been accelerated in the past year, with China consciously presenting itself as a stable, less aggressive superpower to align with. A week before his speech at Davos, Carney and Xi Jinping sought to reset the countries’ relationship during a trip to Beijing, lowering tariffs and dismantling economic barriers. Keir Starmer soon followed on his own trip, looking to usher in a new ‘golden era’ of UK-China relations.
But weight isn’t simply shifting from America to China. India is exploring its own status as an emerging power, seeking to expand its global reach while preventing an oversaturation of Chinese influence in South Asia. Russia may be too unpopular in the West to take up much of America’s slack, but its relationship with a diverse range of global partners likely secures its position in the emerging multipolar world.
As the world’s balance readjusts, new partnerships and alliances are springing up to accommodate. The clearest example is BRICS, which, although marred by internal disputes and disagreements, is seeking to pave the way to an alternative to the dollar-based international trade pathways through which America has maintained its monetary dominance.
Beyond BRICS, more geographically specific alliances are forming. The internationalism of the neoliberal era is giving way to regionalism, as areas like the Sahel’s AES and East Asia secure reliable trade and security ties. Carney’s plea to “middle power” countries, that they should diversify their economic streams and lean on one another more than on superpowers, seems to be the playbook of non-superpowers more broadly.
This shift may be troublesome for Britain. Our defence systems are reliant on the US’s support, and our economy leans on the free flow of capital that supports London’s financial sector. Our current attempts to align ourselves with the EU reflect this move towards regionalism, as European bonds are being reinforced in defence pacts and EU-based trade expansions.
Not everyone will mourn this loss. For Libya, Iraq, Venezuela, and Cuba, this rules-based international order never existed. The free trade, economic expansion and stability enjoyed by Canada and other middle powers were one side of the coin; military interventions, devastating blockades and imperialism were always the other.
Even so, a multipolar world is not necessarily any safer than a world of US hegemony. Opposing great powers have a tendency to engage in proxy wars, encourage arms races, and compete for influence in particular bottleneck regions. Even if we avoid WW3, the new world will be violent and unstable, with the threat of great power collisions growing day by day.
A good time to start drinking, indeed.
