Sahra Wagenknecht’s political breakout has been astounding. Her brand of “left conservatism” and regular attacks on “lifestyle leftists” make for fairly unexpected populist politics that could reshape the hard left in Germany and Central Europe. In the recent German regional elections, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), performed exceptionally, especially considering it was founded early this year. BSW came third in state elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia, with vote shares ranging from 11-16%. Currently, it is polling just under 10% at the national level.
Sahra Wagenknecht began her political career by joining the Socialist Unity Party (SED) as it was losing its iron grip over East Germany. A committed Marxist-Leninist, she made a name for herself, organising within the SED’s successor party for a faction representing hardline views. In more recent years, she became a stalwart of Die Linke (the successor of the successor of the SED) but became frustrated with its socially progressive and ecological politics. A clear turning point came when she was attacked with a chocolate cake at Die Linke’s 2016 party congress over her opposition to centre-right Angela Merkel’s pro-refugee policies. Her later opposition to COVID-19 lockdowns and sympathy for the Kremlin amidst the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a break in relations with Die Linke (the Left) and the official founding of the BSW in January 2024.
With the collapse in support for the coalition government, the BSW has capitalised on discontent by targeting marginalised voters seeking a populist alternative, but who are deeply uncomfortable with the aggressive racism of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Unsurprisingly, the BSW’s rise has been observed most prominently in the deprived former communist east of Germany, a region where the AfD also attracts significant support. Wagenknecht’s reframing of traditionally right-wing positions, such as migration, through leftist rhetoric resonates with many who feel alienated by the AfD’s overt racism.
Wagenknecht’s rise has put pressure on the governing Social Democrats (SPD). Along with the AfD, the BSW’s hardline policies have undermined support for Ukraine, ultimately posing challenges for the SPD Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, who has been an advocate of supporting Ukraine. While the hawkish Green foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, continues to push for further commitment to Ukraine, her fellow coalition partners have become exasperated by their support’s economic and domestic political costs.
Germany has also extended its land border controls with its neighbours in response to a series of knife attacks carried out by asylum seekers. These attacks, combined with the arrival of more than 1.1 million Ukrainian refugees, have fostered a shift in public sentiment regarding migration and facilitated the success of anti-immigration parties.
However, this is only the start of the SPD’s problems as recent results in Brandenburg has made their previous coalition with the Christian Democrats (CDU) no longer numerically possible. Realistically, only an SPD-BSW coalition would reach the 45-seat majority needed in the Brandenburg legislature. With rumours that the current federal coalition government could dissolve before Christmas, the potential necessity to ally with the BSW in coalition and fend them off at the ballot box may force the SPD to water down their commitments to Ukraine and trans-Atlanticism.
The rise of Wagenknecht has also coincided with Die Linke’s seemingly terminal decline. Currently polling at 3% nationally, and facing the threat of the BSW, their prospects are bleak. In what may be a lesson to parties with similar politics, they have failed to secure a significant coalition of voters outside their vanguard of ideologically committed loyalists. Historically a force to be reckoned with in Germany’s ex-communist east, their support more than halved in the three recent state elections in the east of the country. With the BSW solidifying itself as a popular alternative to Die Linke, it may prove difficult for Wagenknecht’s former party to reassert itself in Germany’s political landscape.
Across Europe, George Galloway, leader of the Worker’s Party of Britain, and Robert Fico, Prime Minister of Slovakia, are strong proponents of this blend of political ideology. Like Wagenknecht, they combine social conservatism and scepticism towards trans-Atlanticism with left-wing economics. Fellow ex-communist Fico led his party to win the most seats in Slovakia’s 2023 Elections, having pledged to end military support for neighbouring Ukraine. This result demonstrates the powerful mobilising effect of this political brand, which capitalises on the fallout of COVID-19 and the consequences of the invasion of Ukraine.
Wagenknecht’s class-first politics may be more liberal than her SED past, but they are still, in many ways, deeply radical. A total rejection of intersectional identity politics, environmentalism, and solidarity with Ukraine has become taboo across much of the Western left. She and Fico represent formidable rejections of the values typically associated with the New Left across the former Eastern Bloc. While her British counterpart, Galloway, has not seen much success outside his sectarian campaigns in by-elections, left conservatism appears to be set to stay as a fixture on the continent. The question is, will this ideology continue to spread westwards into the rest of Germany or to other deprived regions of Europe?
